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FOREIGN MARRIAGES AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

By

HERBERT

F.

GooDRICH*

Marriage as a Contract and a Status
T is common these days to speak of marriage as a contract. Not
only do we use the term "marriage contract" as meaning a
promise to marry in the future, but also to describe the contract or
expression of consent by which the parties take each other for husband and wife. The statutes of many of our states declare marriage
to be a "civil contract." 1 A moment's thought will show great differences between marriage and the ordinary civil contract. A marriage contract can be contracted only between a man and a woman;
it has no validity if one of the parties has already entered into a
similar contract with someone else. A minor may, under certain
restrictions, enter into and be bound by it. It is, in many states,
hedged about with formal requirements. If one of the parties
breaks his promise to "love and honor," no damages are recoverable
for the breach. Nor can the parties to this transaction withdraw
when they please. The only way they can get out, once having
entered into a valid marriage, is through legal proceedings, or death
of one spouse. And there are numerous rights and duties arising
out of marriage (such as support by the husband, services by the
wife) of which no mention is made in the contract.
It is clear that marriage is much more than a contract. It is a
contract, to be sure; the element of mutual assent must be present;
it is a consensual transaction. It is a "civil" contract because for
the purposes of the law no ecclesiastical element enters in. The
law does not now look upon it as a sacrament. If civil requirements
are complied with, that is sufficient, whatever else a church may
demand of its members. But once the contract is executed, marriage
becomes a domestic relation. "When formed, this relation is no
more a contract than 'fatherhood' or 'sonship' is a contract." 2 The
relation of husband and wife is one of personal status, a relation
created and destroyed by act of law, not by the mere consent of
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
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the parties, and of legal importance to all the world.8 As applied
here, at any rate, the quality of permanence distinguishes this matter
of status from a purely consensual transaction.
Marriage is the most important of the domestic relations. The
state has an interest in it as well as the immediate parties, for marriage is the foundation of the family, and around the family many
of our present day social institutions are built.
With the purely local phases of the law governing the relation
of husband and wife, Conflict of Laws has no concern. Nor do we
deal with Public International Law problems, such as the question
of expatriation by marriage. We are concerned with two questions:
first, what law governs the creation of the marriage relation; and
second, the recognition and protection to be given the relation and
incidents arising therefrom, under the law of states other than that
in which the relationship was created.
Rules of Domicile and Natiomlity as Governing Status
It is conceivable that rules governing the creation of legal relations like marriage should be controlled by whatever law happened
to have authority over the parties at the time, as is the case with
rights of action for tort. The law where the parties happened to
be might declare them married or declare their marriage at an end.
But this would. largely do away with the permanent quality characteristic of matters of status. Some one law ought to control in
matters of this nature. In common law jurisdictions the law of the
domicile of the party involved is the one which controls status. In
most of the civil law countries the rule has been changed, and the
governing law is that of nationality. 4 In the Anglo-American view
of the matter, it is the sovereign at the domicile, the place where the
person has his permanent abode, who is most concerned in affairs
like his domestic relations.
How far will the sovereign of the domicile go in regulating the
marriage of its citizens? The law of one state might say to a person domiciled there: If you want to be validly married, you must,
within this state, make the kind of a contract herein prescribed.
Something like this is required in divorce proceedings, which have

a Bi.Lj

on the Commi=r or LAws, § x43 gives this description of personal

status.
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for their object the termination of the marriage relation. But such
a rule would make it impossible for an Iowa man to marry a Wisconsin woman at the bride's home, and is not the law.
As an alternative, the domiciliary law might say: You may be
married outside our borders, but you must be authorized to marry
under our rules, and conform to the essentials which we lay down.
If we forbid you to marry, you cannot, by going elsewhere, contract
valid marriage. The rules governing the subject of marriage in
European civil-law states come, it seems, pretty close to such a statement of the law, except that it is the national, instead of the domiciliary, law which controls. 5 Indeed, as a practical matter, it is perilous practice for an American to marry a foreigner without a thorough investigation of the matrimonial requirements of the foreigner's
national law.0
Finally, the domiciliary law might declare that if a person goes
through a marriage ceremony, valid where performed, then this creates the marriage status by the domiciliary law. The American law
is not a great way from such a rule, as will appear from subsequent
paragraphs.
Law Governing Validity-The Orthodox Statement
The usual method of statement of the common law doctrine on
the rule governing the validity of a marriage is well set out by Judge
Story. The general principle, he says, is that between persons, suis
juris,7 the validity of a marriage is to be decided by the law of the
place where it is celebrated. If valid there it is valid everywhere.
If invalid there it is equally invalid everywhere. The most prominent if not the only known exceptions to the rule, Judge Story says,
are those marriages involving polygamy and incest, those positively
prohibited by the public law of a country from motives of policy
and those celebrated in a foreign country by persons who, under
special circumstances, are entitled to the benefit of the laws of their
own country.'
5Continental authorities are cited by Professor Lorenzen in his CASES
ON CONFLICT

or LAWS, 536 note.

J.H. Beale, "The Law of Capacity in International Marriages," 15

382.
R
HIARV. L ,EV.
7This is a question-begging phrase. By what law is the question whether
the person is "suis juris" to be determined?
8 STORY, CONFLICT or LAWS, (Ed. 7) ; § 113, et seq.
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It is not doubted that this statement sets out the effect of the
authorities with substantial accuracy, though the third exception
mentioned by Judge Story needs to be carefully limited. Indeed, it
may be said on abundant authority that the general American rule is
that a marriage good where contracted is good everywhere, or, as it
is sometimes phrased, that the validity of a marriage is governed
by the lex loci contractus.9 It is desirable to analyze the problem
further, however, especially in regard to the situations where a marriage, valid where contracted, is denied recognition at the domicile
of the parties or elsewhere. First may be considered what is necessary to make a marriage "good where contracted."
Requirements of the Law of Place of Contracting

The validity of a marriage will depend, first, upon compliance
with the requirements of the marriage law where the alleged marriage takes place. If that law prescribes compliances with certain
formalities as essential, omission to meet these requirements will be
fatal to the recognition of the marriage elsewhere."0 Possible exceptions to this rule are discussed below. Conversely, if the parties
comply with the rules governing entrance into the relation at the
place of marriage, they will be recognized elsewhere as husband and
wife, even in a state where stricter or different rifles concerning
0 Petras v. P.etras, (Del.) io5 Atl. 835; Reifschneider v. Reifschneider,
24i I1. 92, 89 N. E4 255; Dumarely v. Fishly, xo Ky. (3 A. K. Marsh) igs;
Loring v. Thorndike, 87 Mass. 257; Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126;McHenry v. Brackin, 93 Minn. 5IO, 1oi N. W. 96o; Jordan v. Tel. Co., 136 Mo.
App. i92, 116 S. W. 432; Hills v. State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N. W. 836, 57 L. R. A.
155 and note; Bolmer v. Edsall (N. J.), iO6 AUt. 646; In re Hall, 7o N. Y.
Supp. 4o6; Miller v. Miller, 76 W. Va. 352, 85 S. E. 542; Lyannes v. Lyannes
(Wis.), 177 N. W. 683. Sometimes a statute so provides. See Darling v.
Dent, 82 Ark. 76, loo S. W. 747; Hilton v. Stewart, 15 Idaho i5o, 96 Pac.
579; Griswold v. Griswold, 23 Colo. App. 365; State v. Hand, (Neb.), 126
N. W. 1002, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 753. Reference should be made to annotations upon the general subject in 57 L. R. A. 155, II ib. (N. S.) 1o82; 17 ib.
8oo; 26 ib. 177; 28 ib. 753 and 43 ib. 356.
10 Canale v. People, I77 Ill. 219, 52 N. E. 31o; Jordan v. M. K. Tel. Co.,
136 Mo. App. 192, 116 S. W. 432; In re Hall, 7A N. Y. S. 4o6. It is assumed
that compliance with the statute is, obligatory if the marriage is to be valid.
Many statutes laying down formal requirements are interpreted as directory
merely; non-compliance does not invalidate the marriage. Dumaresly v.
Fishly (Ky.), 3 A. K. Marsh, 1i98; Hiram v. Pierce, 45 Mo. 367, 71 Am. Dec.
555. Reaves v. Reaves, i5 Okl. 24o, 92 Pac. 490, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 353.
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formality are in force.11 This is shown in the frequent recognition
permit
of foreign "common law" marriages in states which do 1not
2
this informal method of entering the matrimonial status.
An interesting application of the general rule came up in a recent
federal case. A man in Minnesota sent to the woman, who was living in Missouri, a written agreement in duplicate, signed by him,
whereby the parties undertook to assume from that date henceforth
the relation of husband and wife. The woman signed the papers
and sent one back to the man. It was held that this acceptance constituted a valid marriage in Missouri and the woman could recover
damages, as widow, in Minnesota for a wrongful act resulting in
The validity of the marriage depended
the death of the husband.
upon compliance with the laws of Missouri, and presumably would
have been decided the other way had Missouri been a state which
required cohabitation as well as consent for a common law marriage.
The same principles are applicable, it is believed, to the question
of the validity of a marriage by proxy. If such a marriage is permitted by the lex loci contractus, and it probably is permitted unless
positive legislation forbids it, the marriage so contracted is good
1
everywhere, at least so far as formal requirements are concerned. '
Exceptions to Compliance with Leax Loci Contractus
Statements may be found to the effect that, while a marriage
good by the lex loci contractus is good elsewhere, it does not follow
15
Such
that if it is not good by that law it is not good elsewhere.
"xHallett v. Collins, 51 U. S. x74; Miller v. Miller, 76 W. Va. 352, 85
S. E. 542; Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (Eng.), 2 Hagg. Con. 54.
12 Darling v. Dent, 82 Ark. 7, 1oo S. W. 747; Petras v. Petras (Del.),
io5 Ati. 835; Travers v. Reinhardt, 25 App. D. C. 567; Clark v. Clark, 52
N. J. Eq. 65o, 3o Ati. 181; Nelson v. Carlson, 48 Wash. 651, 94 Pac. 477.
Comments approv23 G. N. Ry. Co. v. Johnson (C. C. A.), 254 Fed. 683.
Prof. Beale, 33
by
and
848,
Rrv.
L.
HARv.
in
32
found
are
ing the decision
HARV. L. Ri v. 13.
14 See the discussion, "Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws" by
Prof. Lorenzen, 32 HARv. L. REv. 473. The question of the validity of marriages in Chinese fashion without personal presence of the parties has been
taised but not decided, because the performance of the proper ceremony in
that country, based on consent, was not shown. In re Lum Lin Ying, 59
Fed. 682; Republic v. Li Shee, 22 Hawaii 329.
15 Canale v. People, 177 Il. 219, 52 N. E. 31o; Phillips v. Gregg, io Watts
158, 36 Am. Dec. 158 (cf. City v. Williamson, io Phila. 177); Ruding v.
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assertions must be received with caution, for they are contrary to
the general rule as set out above. An apparent, though not real,
exception is found in those situations where the local requirements
have been held inapplicable to foreigners temporarily within the
jurisdiction."0 No question of a valid marriage in violation of the
lex loci contractus is involved in them, however.
More difficult is the problem presented by a federal statute providing that marriages in a foreign country, in the presence of a consular officer of the United States, between persons who would be
authorized to marry if residing in the District of Columbia, shall
be valid for all purposes. 7 Suppose parties are married in a consulate in a foreign country, without complying with the provisions
of the local law. Can this statute validate their marriage in New
York? Marriage has been said to be a matter for state law to determine," and the general language of the federal statute, it has been
suggested, should be construed with reference to those persons only
who are under the direct legislative jurisdiction of the United States,
such as the inhabitants of the District of Columbia or the territories.
State legislation to the same effect has been recommended.' 9 Such
legislation, it may be noted, would have the effect of declaring valid
a marriage which was not good by the lex loci contractus.
Are marriages performed on the high seas an exception to the
rule requiring compliance with the lex loci contractus? It has been
said that since on the high seas there is no law, the marriage will
be valid or not according to the law of the domicile.2 0 Since it has
been held that a ship takes with it the law of its state, 21 it might well
Smith, 2 Hagg. Con. 371, 390. In Hynes v. McDermott, 9i N. Y. 451, 43
Am. Dec. 677, the question was raised but not decided.

16Loring v. Thorndyke, 87 Mass. 257; In re Lando's Estate,
257, 127 N. W. 1125; Davis v. Davis, i Abb. N: C. i4o.

112

Minn.

17 U. S. Comp. Stat., § 7632.

is G. N. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683.
19 See a discussion of the point in ii R.PoRTs or Aman. BAR AssN., 3x3
et seq., and see also 2 Moopies INTu'NATIoNAI. LAW DIGZST 490. Whether the

federal government could accomplish the result under the treaty making power involves a question of constitutional law beyond the scope of this discussion.
-2 Norman v. Norman, "121 Cal. 62, 54 Fac. 143, 42 L. R. A. 343, 66 Am.
St. Rep. 74; comment in: 12 HARv. L. Rzv. 273; and see 6o Am. St. Rep. 947,
note.
21 Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 61o; McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546.
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be said that the marriage, to be valid, must conform to the law of
vessel, if American, was registered, and it has
the state where the
22
been so decided.

Form and Capacity
The statement of the general rule that a marriage good where
celebrated is good everywhere makes no distinction between the
form of the ceremony and capacity of the parties to enter the marriage relation. While there is abundant authority which upholds
the validity of marriages by this broad test, there is a substantial
body of cases denying validity to a foreign marriage contracted by
a party who was forbidden to marry, or forbidden to contract the
particular marriage in question, by the law of his domicile. Further
inquiry is necessary to determine the significance of this growing
body of decisions, various examples of which are set out below.
The current English doctrine may first be mentioned. In the
famous case of Brook v. Brook,23 a widower and the sister of his.
deceased wife, being lawfully domiciled in England, while on a temporary visit to Denmark had a marriage solemnized between them,
which was by the laws of Denmark lawful and valid. In a suit in
equity, brought after the death of both parties to ascertain the rights
of the children in their father's property, the House of Lords held
that the marriage in Denmark was wholly void and that the children
of the marriage were illegitimate. Of Brook v. Brook and cases
like it, it could be said that, "A long series of decided cases had
made it almost certain that the personal law (i. e., the law of the
domicile) would be held in England to decide the capacity of one
person to marry another. '12 4 In 19o8, however, the English Court
22

Bolmer v. Edsall (N. J.Eq.), io6 At. 646. See Hynes v. McDermott,
7 Abb. N. C. 98, affd., 82 N. Y. 41. For a discussion of the question in England as regards English legislation, see J.Dundas White in 17 LAW Q. Rv.
283.
23 9 H. L. Cas. 193.
24
BATY, POLAiUZrD LAW, 4o. Thus in, Mette v. Mette, i Sw. & Tr. 416,
a man domiciled in England purported to marry his deceased wife's sister
in Frankfort. The German law did not prohibit the marriage; the English
law did and the marriage was held invalid. In Sottomayer v. De Barres,
3 P.Div. i,cousins supposedly domiciled in Portugal were married in England, but were incapable by the law of this domicile. It was held that the
marriage was invalid, on the basis that capacity was a matter for the dom-
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of Appeal held that a man domiciled in France, and by its law incapable of marriage, was validly married for English purposes when
he went through a marriage ceremony with an Englishwoman in
England.2 5 The result then, according to a distinguished English
writer, is that "Apparently an Englishman takes his personal law
abroad in this matter and a foreigner deposits his in bond at the Dover Customs House." "We will use the personal law," this writer
continues, "to impose our own restrictions, and perhaps to confer
our own tolerances, abroad, but * * * we decline to use it in order
to introduce foreign restrictions and tolerances here."2
ExtraterritorialEffect of Prohibitions on Marriage by Law of
Domicile
A man domiciled in Michigan wishes to marry a Michigan

woman, but such marriage is forbidden by Michigan law. Can he,
by crossing the state line into Indiana, where, it may be assumed,
his marriage would be legal, contract a marriage which will be good
at his domicile or in a third state'?. It may be assumed that he follows the forms prescribed by Indiana law.
The question arises in cases involving several types of prohibition upon marriage. Chief among them are provisions forbidding
remarriage after divorce, provisions against marriage of relatives
within certain degrees, miscegenation statutes, or those establishing
a certain age below which parties are declared incapable of marrying.
It will make for clearness if there is set out here what is believed
to be the underlying legal principle back of what is an apparent coniciliary law. On the second trial of the cause, it being found that the respondent was domiciled in England, the marriage was declared valid.
25 Ogden v. Ogden [igo8], Prob. 46. See also Chetti v. Chetti igog], Prob.
67, commented upon by Prof. Dicey in 25 LAW Q. REv. 202. A Hindu was
held (in effect) not to have brought his incapacity with him, when he married in England.
2
6 BATY, POLAxIzzn LAW, 41, and 61. See also 53, et seq. Dr. Baty calls
Ogden's case, "a distinct repudiation by the Court of Appeal in 19o7 of the
express views of the Court of Appeal in 1877, and of the House of Lords
in I861." p. 59. See further, by the same learned author,--"Capacity and
Form of Marriage in the Conflict of Laws"; 26 YAi. L. JouP. 444, in which
he says, 456, "The worst solution of all . . . is that of enforcing one's own
law as a personal law abroad, while refusing, or grudgingly according recognition to foreign laws at home."
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fusion of authorities. It is as follows: The place where a man and
a woman happen casually to be at the time of the performance of a
marriage ceremony cannot finally determine the question of the
validity of their marriage." The marriage relation, both in its creation and in its termination, is a matter of importance to the state
with which one is most intimately connected-i. e., where he has his
domicile-as well as to the party himself. The law insists vigorously upon adherence to the law of the domicile in terminating the
marriage relation. Is the domiciliary law to be ignored in the equally
important matter of creating the relation? Surely not. The real
settlement of the validity of the marriage should depend upon the
law of the domicile when the alleged marriage takes place. But
there is a strong public policy, often expressed, for upholding the
validity of marriage wherever possible. So in most cases compliance
with the law at the place of celebration results in a marriage whose
validity is universally recognized. And so general is this recognition
that we have the broadly stated rule, "good where contracted, good
everywhere." But if the union in question is one forbidden by the
law of the domicile, there is a clash between the general policy of
upholding the validity of marriage agreements and that of sustaining
the state's ideas of propriety and good morals in the marriage relation. Often the foreign marriage is sustained. But if the legislative prohibition is explicit in declaring the marriage void, or if the
violation of the domiciliary notion of good morals is flagrant, the
attempt at marriage may fail. If void by the law of the domicile,
it should follow that it is void elsewhere as well. The soundness of
28
this position is tested in the cases immediately to be discussed.
27 Conformity with the lex loci contractus will, in general, be the first
test however. That has already been shown with regard to formal requirements; presumably it is also true as to capacity. Mcllvain v. Scheibley, io9
Ky. 455, 59 S. W. 498; Blaisdell v. Bickum. 139 Mass. 250, i N. E. 281;
Schaffer v. Krestovnikow (N. J.), io2 AtI. 246. But see City of Williamson,
io Phila. 176.
28 Substantially this view is taken in a note in 26 H-nv. L. RZv. 536.
The following language seems in point also: Werner, J., (dissenting), in
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2o6 N. Y. 341, 353, 99 N. E. 845: "But marriage, although initiated by contract, creates a status with manifold continuing rights, duties and obligations. These . . . must necessarily be subject
to the law of the domicile, for otherwise the state would have no control
over its subjects or citizens."
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Refusal to recognize the validity of foreign marriages has unfortunate results, for it tends to render uncertain one of the most important of human relations, a relationship in which certainty is surely
as imperatively demanded as in commercial transactions. The only
methods of avoiding the confusion would seem to be either a uniform statute on the subject of capacity (or incapacity) to marry or
a general recognition, without exceptions, of the validity of a marriage good where celebrated. Neither seems immediately in prospect.
Prohibitions Upon Remarriage After Divorce
Statutes restricting further marriage of divorced persons are
very common and take a variety of forms. They may forbid the
marriage of both innocent and guilty parties within a given time
from the rendition of the decree, may impose a prohibition upon the
guilty party only, or may leave it to the court to impose or remove
such restriction. The question here involved is raised when parties
are divorced in a state having such restrictions and one of them, in
evasion of the domiciliary law, goes outside the state and contracts
a marriage valid by the lex loci contractus. Will the marriage be
recognized at home?
One situation should be distinguished at the outset. Under the
divorce practice in some jurisdictions, an absolute decree is not first
entered, but merely an interlocutory order or decree nisi, which is
made absolute at some later date, if in the meantime the court has
not become convinced that a divorce should not be granted. 0 Until
this decree is made final, the parties are not divorced; a second marriage is bigamous because the first one still exists. 30 Statutory provisions declaring divorced persons incapable of marrying until the
expiration of the period in which an appeal from the divorce decree
may be taken might conceivably be construed to operate as making
that decree conditional and thus preventing remarriage until such.
time had elapsed. There is authority for and against this construction.81 It may be said in comment that if the law-making body
is the method provided in the Uniform Divorce Act, §§ 16 and 17.
Pettit v. Pettit, 93 N. Y. S. iooi; Earle v. Earle, 126 N. Y. S. 317;
Warter v. Warter (Eng.), L. R. 15 Prob. Div. 152. See Knoll v. Knoll, 1o4
Wash. 1IO, 176 Pac. 22.
s1 For it: Eaton v. Eaton, 66 Neb. 678, 92 N. W. 995; McLennan v.
McLennan, 31 Or. 48D, 50 Pac. 8D2; Hooper v. Hooper, 67 Or. 187, 135 Pac..
29 This

30
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desires to make the original decree interlocutory merely it is not
difficult so to provide in express terms.
Upon the main question-recognition at home of the foreign
marriage of a divorced person forbidden to remarry by his domiciliary
law-the authorities are sharply divided. What is probably the
weight of authority follows the general rule that a marriage valid
where contracted is valid everywhere, and upholds the validity of
the type of union under consideration.3 2 But very respectable courts,
33 The
some of them in modern decisions, take the opposite view.
statutes forbidding the marriage vary, as has been said, and this
has naturally affected some of the results. Thus, if the prohibition
against marriage is applicable only to the guilty party in the divorce
suit, it may be called penal, to be narrowly construed and not effective outside the state.3 4 Or there may be a statutory recognition of
3
the "good where contracted, good everywhere" rule, 5 equally a
declaration of legislative policy with the prohibition against this particular marriage. But in other cases reaching opposite conclusions
on the question there is no real distinction in the statutes involved,
which accounts for the results.
It was suggested, though not decided, by the Wisconsin' court, that this
rule might be applicable to a general prohibition upon remarriage within a
year from the decree. Lanham V. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N. W. 787, 17
L. R. A. (N. S.) 8o4. Contra: Re Wood, 137 Cal. 129, 69 Pac. goo; Griswold v. Griswold (Colo. App.), 129 Pac. 56o; Willey v. Willey, 22 Wash.
15, 6o Pac. 145; State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.)
8oo.
32Re Wood's Estate, 137 Cal. 129, 69 Pac. goo; Griswold v. Griswold,
23 Colo. App. 365, 129 Pac. 56o; Loth v. Loth's Est. (Colo.), 129 Pac. 827;
Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Iowa 142, i3o N. W. 785; Farrell v. Farrell (Ia.), 181
N. W. 12; Comm. v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458; Woodward v. Blake (N. D.), 164
N. W. 156; Van Voorhis v. Brintall, 86 N. Y. 18; In re Eichler, 146 N. Y. S.
846; State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl. Si. See also the L. R. A. notes
cited in note 9, supra.
3 Wilson v. Cook, 256 II1. 46o, ioo N. R. 222; Succession of Gabisso,
uIg La. 704, 44 So. 438, 1I L. R. A. (N. S.) io82; In re Stull's Est., 383 Pa.
625, 39 Atl. 16, 63 Am. St. Rep. 776; Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 204, 10
525.

S. -Nr.305; Knoll v. Knoll, IO4 Wash. 110, 176 Pac. z and Washington cases

cited (but see Willey v. Willey,

22

Wash.

115,

6o Pac. 145) ; Lanham v. Lan-

ham, 136 Wis. 36o, 137 N. W. 787, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 8o4.
34 Comm.

v. Lane, supra; Van Voorhis v. Brintall, supra; but see Penne-

gar v. State, supra.
35 Griswold v. Griswold, supra.
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.The issue on which the decision turns is not, it is believed,
whether the statute prohibiting the marriage is an expression of the
public policy of the state enacting the statute. 86 A policy against
such marriage is surely shown by the legislative declaration prohibiting it.87 But the policy thus expressed runs afoul, in these cases,
of another policy which is well settled, whether expressed in positive
terms by statute or not. That is the policy of upholding a marriage
where possible. To deny the marriage may relieve one from an
obligation solemnly entered into; it may, bastardize innocent children
born of the union. So the issue is whether the policy of prohibition,
as expressed by the legislative body, is strong enough to prevail over
the policy demanding the upholding of the marriage. If the language is unmistakable the court must follow it. If not, the answer
will in a measure depend upon which policy has the greater weight
with the court, and opinions will and do differ.
It has been held that if a divorced person leaves the state and
acquires a domicile elsewhere, and then marries (the marriage being
valid by the law of the new domicile) within the prohibited time, his
marriage is nevertheless good and will be so recognized in the jurisdiction where tfe divorce was granted, even though it would have
been declared void had he remained domiciled in the latter state. 38
Further, the cases cited above which have declared the foreign marriage invalid all involved the recognition of the foreign marriage at
the domicile of the divorced party. This lends support to the view
that it is in reality the domiciliary law which determines the validity
of a marriage.
Statutes Forbidding Miscegenation
An act which may bring the individual sharply into conflict with
the policy of his domiciliary law regarding the institution of mariage is the violation of a statute against miscegenation. A white
person and a negro, domiciled in a state where such marriage is forbidden, go into a state where it is allowed, go through a marriage
8

6As is said in 57 L. R. A. 171, note.
the language of the court in Lanham v. Lanham, supra.
asState v. Fenn 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417, 17 1. R. A. (N. S.) 8oo;
ton, x8 Mass. (I Pick.) 5o6; People v. Steere, 184 Mich. 556, i5I N. W. 617;
Scott v. Atty. Gen., L, R. ix P. D. 128. Reaching the same result, though
the decision is not put expressly on this ground, is Webster v. Modern
Woodmen (Iowa), x86 N. W. 659.
27 See
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ceremony, and return to their domicile. It is not surprising to find
that the decisions from the southern states uniformly declare such
an attempted union void. 89 Local abhorrence of such a mating outweighs any general policy of upholding marriage. 40 There is less
basis, however, for such decisions criticising, as some of them do, a
contrary result in a northern state41 where the social question is
viewed in a different light.
Foreign "Incestuous" Marriages
While prohibitions against incest are general, legislative policy
differs in defining that degree of relationship within which an
attempted marriage is regarded as incestuous. If the various statutes
are to be taken as announcing that infringements thereof are "in
violation of the Divine law,"4 2 there certainly is a difference of legislative opinion as to what that law is. The problem for the court is
the same as that involved in the cases where there was a remarriage
outside the state of domicile within the prohibited time after divorce.
Is the local prohibition so strong, either by express language or necessary implication, that the court at the domicile will declare the
attempted marriage void, instead of applying the usual "good where
so State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (federal court, Ga.) ; Dupre v. Boulard's
Ex'r, io La. Ann. 411; Succession of Gabisso, 1i9 La. 704, 44 So. 438, IX
L R. A. (N. S.) io82; State v. Kennedy, 76 N. C. 251, 2 Am. Rep. 683;
State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. (7Baxt.) 9; Kinney v. Comm., 3o Gratt (Va.) 858,
32

Am. Rep. 69o.

40 Sometimes this abhorrence is shown in very fervent terms, as shown
in thd Kinney case, supra, where the court says: "The purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of both races, and the highest advancement of our cherished Southern civilization, under which two distinct
races are to work out and accomplish the destiny to which the Almighty has
assigned them on this continent-all require that they should be kept separate
and distinct, and that connections and alliances so unnatural that God and
nature seem to forbid them, should be prohibited by positive law, and be
subject to no evasion.'
41 Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham, 16 Mass. 157.
Cf. § Ir, 367 Comp. Laws Mich. 19,5, expressly declaring valid marriages of
this type which had taken place prior to the statute. In Wilbur's Est., 8
Wash. 35, 4o Am. St. Rep. 886, the court declared a marriage between a
white man and an Indian void, the man being domiciled in Washington
though the marriage was valid according to the Indian custom on the reservation.
42 Per Lord Wensleydale in Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. Cas. 193, the famous
deceased wife's sister case.
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contracted, good everywhere" rule. Instances where a marriage good
where contracted has been declared void at the domicile because of
4
relationship of the parties are not frequent. 3 Indeed, some of the
states which refuse recognition to foreign marriages of their divorced
citizens nevertheless hold this type good." This may be because, in
most of these rules covering prohibited degrees, the various laws
cover common ground and differences which exist are matters of
degree rather than divergencies in policy.
Lack of Consent of Parent or Guardian
Statutes frequently require consent by parents to the marriage
of minors, and young people desiring to marry not infrequently
seek to avoid the effect of refusal of such consent by a journey to
another jurisdiction for the performance of the marriage ceremony.
Then arises the same question whether the marriage, good where
entered into, will be valid at home. Generally, the answer is in
4
the affirmative, 45 though there is some dissent." The "good where
performed, good everywhere" rule .has been applied also to the foras a spendthrift who mareign marriage of one under guardianship
47
ries without his guardian's consent.
179.

4Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, io6 Pac. 5oo, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.)
See also L. R. A. notes cited, note 9.
44 People v. Siems, ig Ill. App. 342, (this concerned the marriage of

cousins in Wisconsin. Thq man was from Minnesota, the woman from Illinois, by whose law cousins could not lawfully marry. Her "disability" did
not prevent a valid marriage) ; Leefeld v. Leefeld, 85 Ore. 287, 166 Pac. 953,
where the court emphasized the wording of the statute declaring the marriage
void if solemnized in this state"; Schofield ov. Schofield, 51 Pa. Sup. Ct. 564.
Accord: Stevenson v. Gray, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 193; Fensterwald v. Burk,
129 Md. 131, 89 AUt. 358; 3 A. L. R. 1562; State v. Hand (Neb.), 126 N. W.
(See L. R. A. note for ground ofj attack on
io02, 28 L. ,R. A. (N. S.) 753.
-the marriage in this case.)
45Levy v. Downing, 213 Mass. 334, 1oo N. E. 638 (which turns largely
on jurisdiction to annul); Comm. v. Graham, I57 Mass. 73, 31 N. R. 7o6,
semble; Donahue v. Donahue, ix6 N. Y. S. 241; Reid v. Reid, 129 N. Y. S.
S29 (but see next note) ; Courtright v. Courtright, ii Ohio Dec. 412.
48 Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2o6 N. Y. 341, 99 N. R. 845, 43 L. .R. A.
(N. S.) 355; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 117 N. Y. S. 671. In tlus case the court
seems to think it can give a decree of annulment without declaring the marriage void in the first place. See Smith v. Smith, 84 Ga. 44o, ii S. E. 496.
47 Sturgis v. Sturgis, 51 Ore. 10, 93 Pac. 696, IS L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034;
Ex parte Chace, 26 R.. I. 351, 58 At. 978, 69 L. R. A. 493.
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Uniform Marriage Evasion Act
Mention should be made of the uniform statute 8 on this subject, approved by the Uniform Law Commissioners in 1912 and
now adopted in several states. This act provides in its first section,
"That if any person residing and intending to continue to reside in
this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage
under the laws of this state shall go into another state or country
and there contract a marriage prohibited and declared void by the
laws of this state, such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this state. * * *" The second section makes void a marriage contracted within the state where it would be void by the law
of the party's residence. As between two states which have enacted
this legislation, no change is made in the "good where contracted,
good everywhere" rule, for the prohibited marriage is ineffective
where entered into. But if a person goes from a state which has
passed the statute to one which has not, and then contracts a marriage prohibited by his domiciliary law but allowed in the second
state, the effect seems to be to codify what has been heretofore the
minority rule. Under the statute, the domiciliary law will in all
cases refuse the marriage relationship to one forbidden to marry
under its law. In this respect the statute marks a serious change in
policy with regard to marriage. Whether such change in policy is
required is a question outside the scope of this discussion.
Effect in Third State of Marriage Void by Law of Domicile
The cases cited above are those in which a marriage, forbidden
by the law of the domicile, has taken place in a state where it is
good by the local law and the question has been raised at the domicile whether the marriage is valid. The underlying principle is
believed to be that while the domiciliary law generally allows the
relationship it may refuse to do so if it is opposed to local policy.
If the domicile refuses to recognize the parties as married, assuming
the view set out is correct, a court in another state should give the
same answer. The point is seldom presented. A recent Wisconsin
case, however, involved the question. An Illinois woman, under
prohibition to marry after divorce, went with an Illinois man to
copy of the statute and other facts concerning it may be found in
Terry, Uniform State Laws, pp. 401, et seq.
48 A
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Indiana, where they married. By Illinois law the attempted marriage was void. The Wisconsin court held that the woman could not
4
recover as widow under the Compensation Act for the man's death. 0
The Illinois rule, by which the foreign marriage of a divorced party
within the prohibited time is considered void, found further recognition in a Michigan case. After an Illinois man had been divorced
he and an Illinois woman went through a marriage in Michigan
within the prohibited time. He having left her, it was held that he
If it is
could not be prosecuted in Michigan for wife desertion.
the law of the domicile which finally governs the creation of the
marriage relation, these cases are correct. There being no marriage
by that law, there is none to recognize in another state. 51
Recognition of Valid Foreign Marriage
A marriage which is good by the law where contracted and which
does not fail because of positive rules of domiciliary law against it
will generally be recognized elsewhere. As stated above, a party
after divorce who acquires a new domicile and contracts a valid marriage under its laws will be recognized as validly married even at
49 Hall v. Ind. Comm., 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W.

312,

L. R. A. 1917 D.

829, The fact that the Wisconsin law on remarriage outside the state after
divorce was the same as that of Illinois while mentioned by the court, seems
immaterial.
5o People v. Steere, 184. Mich. 556, 151 N. W. 617. The grounds for so
holding are not clearly set out. On the view suggested here, the result is
correct. See, for adverse criticism, i3 MIcHiGAN L. Rav. 592.

51 A more recent Wisconsin case gives more trouble. Owen v. Owen,
i9o N. W. 363. The plaintiff, who seeks annulment of his marriage, was a
Wisconsin man who induced defendant to marry him in Michigan the day
after she got her divorce in Illinois, where such remarriage was forbidden.
The court refused annulment, and said the marriage was valid. The case,
at first sight, appears opposed to the Hall case, supra. May it be said, as
upholding it: (I) the plaintifE did not come into court with clean hands. It
was his inducement which caused defendant to act. See Ewald v. Ewald,
(2) The woman abandoned her residence in Illinois, prior
219 Mass. iii.
to the marriage, in Michigan, and did live with the plaintiff in Wisconsin.
If she had acquired a new domicile prior to the marriage, the Illinois prohibition would no longer be applicable. See note 38. The Illinois restriction

might well be held not to apply td one whose home in Illinois is abandoned,
and who, unless the marriage is invalid because of the restriction, will by the
act of marriage immediately acquire a domicile in another state. Compare
the language in section one of the Uniform Statute, supra.
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his former home.5 2 Parties within the degrees of relationship prohibited by the forum will be recognized as married if their marriage
was valid under their domiciliary law.53 In like manner, states prohibiting marriage of whites and negroes have recognized the validity
of such union when valid by the domiciliary law.54
Conceivably, there might be a situation where any recognition of
the foreign marriage would run so contrary to notions of decency
or policy in a state that a court should refuse to grant it. There is
no way, aside from questions which may arise under the federal
Constitution, that a state can be compelled to give effect to any foreign marriage against its will. But it seems hardly conceivable that
among the states of this nation, where differences relate "to the
minor morals of expediency, and to debatable questions of internal
policy,"53 a marriage valid by the law creating it should be denied
all recognition in a sister state. In a situation where differences in
policy are pronounced, as perhaps the marriage of white persons
and negroes, might not some recognition be given to a valid union
of this kind where the parties come from another state, even though
local policy frowned on such a marriage? Cohabitation between
such persons might have a deleterious effect on local morals, and be
forbidden even though they were validly married, while the inheritance of property by a surviving spouse or child of the union would
be entirely innocuous and might well be allowed.55 Some kinds of
recognition may be afforded, though it might not be possible to recognize the marriage for every purpose.
"Non-Christian Marriages"
In a leading English case an eminent judge states "that marriage,
as understood in Christendom, may *** be defined as the voluntary
See note 38, supra.
5 Sutton v. Warren, 5I Mass. (io Metc.) 451; Garcia v. Garcia,
52

25

S. D.

645, i2y N. W. 586, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 424 (there the court denied annulment but did not commit itself upon the question whether the parties could
lawfully cohabit in South Dakota) ; contra, U. S. v. Rodgers, iog Fed. 886.
54
Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120; State v. Ross, 76 N. C. 22; Whittington v. McCaskill, 65 Fla. 62, 61 So. 236, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630.
55 See Mr. Justice Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested
Rights," 27 YALE L. JouR. 656, 662.

5 See "The Extraterritorial Force of Personal Statutes," F. G. Munson, 13 COL. L. RXv. 314.
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union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all
others."5 6 Does that mean that an English court will not recognize
legal consequences of relations between men and women arising
from any other kind of matrimonial institution than that of Christendom? .Language may be found to this effect. In another case"r
it is said: "I am bound to hold that a union formed between a man
and woman in a foreign country, although it may there bear the
name of marriage * * * is not a valid marriage according to the law
of England, unless it be formed on the same basis as marriages
throughout Christendom. * * *" It is hard to think that if a Mohammedan paid a visit to London with his wife their cohabitation
would be considered unlawful and make them subject to punishment.5 1 But it is not difficult to support a conclusion that an English court for matrimonial causes, applying ecclesiastical law with its
statutory modifications, is not designed to afford relief in cases
where marital rights and duties are of a different sort from that
5
A recent Court of Appeal decision
known to the ecclesiastical law.
56 Lord Penzance in Hyde v. Hyde,. L. R. i P. & D. 130.
57
In re Bethell, 38 Ch. Div. 22o. This is an interesting case. An Englishman in Africa, contracted a union with a woman of a native tribe, according to its rites. He was domiciled in England, but no point was made
of that, the case turning on the point whether this was a "marriage." The
court said not, and thought a child born to the parties was not legitimate.
Compare the decision with the American decisions in Indian cases, in!fra, and
the language of Judge Campbell in Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 76 Mich.
498, 57, 43 N. W. 6o2: "While most civilized nations in our day very wisely
discard polygamy . .

.

yet it is a recognized and valid institution among

many nations, and in no way universally unlawful. We must either hold
that there can be no valid Indian marriage, or must hold that all marriages
are valid which by Indian usage are so regarded." Even in England the
marriage need not be "Christian" however, if monogamous, and the validity of a Japanese marriage has been upheld. Brinkley v. Atty. General, L. R.
r5, P. Div. 76.

58 See the language of the court in the federal case of Polydore v. Prince,
Ware 4or: "If a Turkish or Hindoo husband were travelling in this country with his wife, or temporarily resident here, we should, without hesitation,
acknowledge the relation of husband and wife between them . . ."
50 The statute of 20 and 21 Vict. c. 85 vested the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in a court of record known as "The Court for Divorce
and Matrimonial Causes." In denying an application for restitution of conjugal rights to a party to a Mohammedan marriage, the court makes the following remarks in point here: "We must remember that the English Eccle-
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recognized the right of inheritance of a "t'sip" or secondary wife of
a Chinese merchant of Penang." The woman could inherit, even
though not the wife by a type of marriage known in Christendom.
It was stated by Story, whose language has been repeated by
many courts, that one exception to the rule recognizing the validity of a marriage valid where performed is that of a polygamous
marriage. It is interesting to see what happens to this statement
when a court is actually confronted with facts involving this kind of
matrimonial association or other union not of the type of a monogamous union for life. The point has most frequently arisen, in the
American cases, with regard to the marriage institution among the
Indians. More often than not it arises in connection with the inheritance of property, and turns on the question of the legitimacy of the
children who claim, or through whom claim is made, to a government allotment of land.
It appears from the cases that marriage among the Indians was
a somewhat casual and very informal affair. Spouses became "husband and wife" by living together, sometimes the cohabitation being
preceded by a gift to the bride's parents or payment of purchase
money by the groom. Divorce, if such it may be called, was equally
simple. When the parties ceased to live together the marriage was
at an end. Polgyamy, in some instances at least, was allowed. The
tribes were not subject to the laws of the states. An almost unanimous line of decisions holds that marriages contracted between tribal
Indians, according to the laws and customs of their tribe, at a
time when the tribal relations and government were existing, are to
be upheld in the absence of a federal statute rendering such tribal
laws and customs invalid. 61 This is not a recognition of the informal
siastical Law is founded on the assumption that all the parties litigant are
Christians; indeed originally, more strictly speaking, Christians professing the
doctrines of the church." Ardasee Cursetjee v. Perozeboye, io Moore P. C.
375. Hyde v. Hyde, supra, was a suit for divorce from a Mormon. marriage
assumed to be polygamous.
6 Cheang Thye Phin v. Tan AhLoy (192o), A. C. 369. In Hyde V.
Hyde, .supra,and in Re Ullee, 53 L. T. Rep. 71L (Mohammedan marriage)
the court carefully refrained from passing on the question of succession or
legitimacy. But what of In re Bethell, supra? For an extensive discussion
of the subject from an English 'writer, see Fitzpatrick, "Non-Christian Marriage," 2 Joua. CoMP. LVGIS. (N. S.) 359, 3 ib. 157.
61 Yakima Joe v. To-Is-Lap, 191 Fed. 516; Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala.
48; Moore v. Wa-me-go, 72 Kan. i69, 83 Pac. 4oo; Kobogum v. Jackson Iron
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agreement of parties to take each other as husband and wife known
to our law as a common law marriage, but a marriage according to
the customs of the Indians, something quite different.6 2 Courts have
likewise regarded as valid the marriage of a white man who, in the
Indian country and in accordance with Indian customs, has taken
an Indian woman to wife.6 Where the Indians are no longer living
with the tribe at the time of the alleged marriage the customs of the
tribe have been held inapplicable and the marriage not good unless it
m
complied with the state law.
" The same limitation has been applied
to cohabitation of white and Indian which commenced outside the
Indian country.65
The question of the validity of the Indian "divorce" by separation has also been passed upon in determining the legitimacy of
offspring from a later cohabitation with another spouse. There is
little doubt that such a divorce is recognized as valid when the separation took place in Indian country and when the marriage was
contracted there.6" Divorce in this fashion is not recognized, howCo., 76 Mich. 498, 43 N. W. 6o2; Earl v. Godley, 42 Minn. 361, 44 N. W. 254;
La Framboise v. Day (Minn.), 161 N. W. 529; People v. Rubin, 98 N. Y. S.
787; Ortley v. Ross, 78 Neb. 339, 1io N. W. 982; Oklahoma Land Co. v.
Thomas, 34 Okla. 68i, 127 Pac. 8; James v. Adams (Old.), i55 Pac. 1121;
Meagher v. Harjo (Okla.), 179 Pac. 757; Morgan v. Mc~hee, 24 Tenn. 13;
First Nat. Bank v. Sharpe, 12 Tex4 Civ. App. 223, 33 S. W. 676; In re Wogin-up, (Utah), 192 Pac. 267; Connolly v. Woolrich, 3 Low CAN. L. JouR, 14.
Contra, semble, Roche v. Washington, i9 Ind. 53.
62 La Framboise v. Day (Minn.),

I61 N. W. 529; Buck v. Branson, 34

Okla. 8o7, 127 Pac. 436, 5o L. R. A. (N. S.) 876. The court seemed, at least,
to overlook this in Henry v. Taylor, i6 S. D. 424, 93 N. W. 641.
63 La Pramboise v. Day, .rupra (half breed); Johnson v. Johnson's Admr.,
30 Mo. 72, 77 Am. Dec. 598; Morgan v. McGhee, 24 Tenn. 13; Connolly v.
Woolrich, 3 Low. CAN. L. JouR. 14. Contra, Follansbee v. Wilbur, 14 Wash.
242,44 Pac. 26z (under miscegenation statute).
64Roche v. Washington, i9 Ind. 53, 8r Am. Dec. 376; State v. Ta-chana-tah, 64 N. C. 6r4.
65
Banks v. Galbraith, I49 Mo. 529, 51 S. W. io5, holding that where an
Indian woman, with her parents, leaves the tribe and goes to Missouri, and
is there sold to a'white man with whom she lives, there is no Indian marriage,
but Missouri law controls. The decision seems a limitation upon La Riviere
v. La Riviere, 97 Mo. io, 8o S. W. 840 and Boyer v. Dively, 58 Mo. 51o.
66 Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48; La Framboise v. Day (Minn.), 161
N. W. 529; Buck v. Branson, 34 Okla. 8o7, 127 Pac. 436, 5o L. R. A. (N. S.)
876; James v. Adams (Okla.), 155 Pac. 1121. See also the cases in following
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ever, when the parties are no longer subject to tribal law and customs, but have come under the municipal law of a state.67
Instances where American courts have been called upon to recognize other types of non-monogamous marriages are less common.
The Supreme Court of Iowa recently recognized the wife of a
Mohammedan marriage to be entitled to compensation as a widow
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.68 The deceased had but
one wife, though he could lawfully have had four under Mohammedan law. There is a difference, then, between circumstances
under which a state will create a marriage relation for its citizens, or
recognize the existence of that status when raised with reference to
those domiciled elsewhere. Presumably, no one of our states would
create the marriage status for a man domiciled there with two
women at the same time,"8 a though it should be repeated that the
more or less temporary union of white man and squaw has been
recognized as valid marriage. In none of these cases did it appear
that the white man purported to have more than one wife at one
time. Our courts do recognize the legal fact of and give effect to fornotes. In Cyr. v. Walker, 29 Okla. 281, i6 Pac. 93i, the court went so far
as to declare a divorce-by tribal custom effective though the man married
the woman, who was not a member of the tribe, in, Illinois.
- In re Wo-gin-up (Utah), 192 Pac. 267; Connolly v. Woolrich, 3 Low
CAN. L. JouR. 14. In this case the marriage was in the Indian country according to tribal custom and good. The separation was after the husband
(a white man) had brought the wife back to lower Canada to live. The attempted divorce was invalid. Cf. Johnson v. Johnson's Admr., 3o Mo. 72,
77 Am. Dec. 598, where the white man abandoned the woman prior to his
return, and the divorce was good. Moore v. Wa-me-go, 72 Kan. 169, 83
Pac. 4oo, held that after land allotment proceedings the Indians were citizens of Kansas and an informal divorce was ineffective. Contra, Yakima
Joe v. To-Is-Lap, 191 Fed. 9i6. See, on Indian divorces, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.)
795, and L. R. A. I917 D 574.
- Royal v. Cudahy Packing Co. (Iowa), 19o N. W. 427. See Kapigian
v. Der Minassian, 212 Mass. 412, 99 N. E. 264. In this case the marriage
was between two Christians, domiciled in Turkey. The marriage was ended
by the wife turning Moslem and marrying another. The court recognized
both the marriage and its termination.
08a Thus, in the case of In re Look Wong, 4 Haw. Fed. Dist. Ct. 568,
the court refused to recognize as valid the polygamous marriage of a Chinese merchant who was resident in Hawaii with a woman in China, even
though the marriage was valid by Chinese law. It is not clear, however,
that the legitimacy of the child should have been denied. See comment, 31
HARv. L. Rlv. 892.
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eign matrimonial unions that do not conform to requirements for
the relationship among our people. How far we can go in giving
recognition, not only to the fact of this status but to its incidents, is
not clear. It may well be doubted whether a Mohammedan visitor
would be permitted to cohabit here with his four wives. Children
of the union could, and probably would, be recognized as legitimate,
as they are in the Indian cases. One widow has been held entitled to
rights as a surviving spouse. What a court should do if there were
four is a harder question. If the case involved devolution of personalty, it might be referred to the domiciliary law of the deceased
and distribution made accordingly. A claim by four bereft spouses
under a Workmen's Compensation Act would not be so easily disposed of.69
A The foregoing discussion forms the basis of a chapter on Marriage
for a text-book in CoNmIcT or LAws, in preparation for the Wesft Publishing
Company, St. Paul. It appears by permission of the publishers.

